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iABSTRACT
Today we witness something unprecedented in European history:
sovereign states delegate a great deal of their sovereignty to international and
supranational bodies – and this happens peacefully, with no wars, seemingly
voluntarily. At the same time, centrifugal forces obstruct the 'unification' of
Europe. Theories of international relations which are invoked to explain these
processes tell us very little about why the countries of Europe want or do not
want to 'get closer' to each other. What is it then, what explains best the creation
of an 'ever closer union', paralleled by an increasing willingness of others to
leave that same Union'? The present study asserts that it is history, and not this or
that theory, that explains European politics at the threshold of the third
millennium. It tells what the concept of Europe means today, what sort of a
Europe is likely to emerge if the project of a larger and deeper European Union
will be pursued, and finally, it tells why the European Union is bound to collapse
if regulation rather than deregulation will characterize it in the years to come.
ii
ÖZET
Günümüzde, Avrupa tarihinde önceli olmayan bir olguya tanık oluyoruz: egemen
devletler egemenliklerinin önemli bir bölümünü uluslararası ve devletlerüstü
kurumlara devrediyorlar, ve bu süreç savaşsız, barışçıl yollardan, devletlerin
kendi isteklerine bağlı olarak gerçekleşiyor. Ancak gözlemlenen bir başka olgu,
bu süreç içindeki pek çok dinamiğin "birleşme"ye karşı hareket ettiği
yönündedir. Bu süreçleri açıklamayı amaçlayan çeşitli Uluslararası İlişkiler
teorileri, neden bazı Avrupa ülkelerinin "birleşme"yi isterken, neden bazılarının
bu birleşmeden kaçındıkları sorusunu yanıtlamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu
çalışma, üçüncü binyılın eşiğindeki Avrupa'ya ilişkin soruların yanıtlarının
teorilerde değil, tarihte aranması gerektiğini öne sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda,
"Avrupa" kavramının günümüzde ne anlama geldiği, daha geniş ve daha derin bir
Avrupa Birliği'ni amaçlayan politikanın nasıl bir Avrupa doğuracağı gibi konular
ele alınacaktır. Ayrıca, standartlaşmaya yönelen politikaların önümüzdeki
yıllarda öncellik kazanmasının Avrupa Birliği'nin çöküşünü nasıl beraberinde
getireceği açıklanacaktır.
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1INTRODUCTION
Today we witness something unprecedented in European history: sovereign states
delegate a great deal of their sovereignty to international and supranational bodies
– and this happens peacefully, with no wars, seemingly voluntarily. The very fact
that this process continues today, more than a decade after the demise of the threat
which once had to be ‘balanced’, suggests, that Realist theories of international
relations do not explain the so-called unification processes in Europe at the
beginning of the 21st century. It is rather the ideologies of liberalism and
democracy which seem to account better for current European international
politics. Democratic states act peacefully towards each other, ‘democratic peace
theory’ tells us, and the successes of the European Union in preserving peace and
fostering prosperity are often invoked as being the hard test for this hypothesis.
However, such interpretation of current politics in Europe requires some
clarification. What is peace at the beginning of the 21st century? Does it mean the
absence of war between two or more nation states and their armed forces? If so,
then it is true that European democracies have rarely (if at all) clashed with one
another in armed conflict in the past decade or more. But does violence within
presumably democratic nation states, or within their alliances not indicate the
absence of peace and democracy? Violent separatist movements, like in Northern
Ireland, Corsica or Spain; anti-Semitism and xenophobia in general, as we witness
2them today in Germany, Poland, France, the Czech Republic or Hungary; regular
political and sometimes military conflicts between the two NATO-members
Greece and Turkey; economic warfare between the United States of America and
the European Union and sometimes even among the members of the Union; the
different forms of nationalism – economic, cultural, linguistic, and so forth; and
finally, the different little ‘wars’, as they are waged among the European states in
Brussels, Strasbourg or Luxembourg for more money transfers and less
contributions – all these indicate that Europe is far from being a truly peaceful and
democratic region in the classical meaning of these words.
What is it then, what does explain best the ongoing unification processes in
Europe, paralleled by the centrifugal processes I enlisted above? Is there any
theory of international relations which can explain post-Cold War state behavior
in Europe, both to the West and to the East of the river Oder?
In the present paper I assert that theories of international relations tell us very little
about why today certain countries in Europe adopt the principles of democracy
and liberalism (while others don’t), why certain European countries strive after an
‘ever closer union’1 (whereas others don’t), or why European multiculturalism is
                                                          
1 The expression "an ever closer Union" is used in the ruling of the German Constitutional Court
on the Treaty of Maastricht (12 October 1993): "The Maastricht Treaty establishes an inter-
governmental community (Staatenverbund) for the creation of an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe, which peoples are organized on a State level, rather than a state which  is based
upon the people of one state of Europe (Staatsvolk)". Ever since, the "ever closer Union" is used
when it is to explain what exactly the European Union is, or, when politicians like Helmuth Kohl
try to "hide the fact that the European Union lacks the traditional prerequisite for statehood: the
Staatsvolk, the people in the political sense of the word." See Gian Enrico Rusconi. The Difficulty
in Building a European Identity. The International Spectator, Volume XXXIII No. 1 (January-
March 1998). For the full text on the ruling see International Legal Materials, vol. 33, no.2, 1994.
pp.395-444.
3said to further trans-continental solidarity, tolerance and understanding (while it is
exactly the increasing awareness of this multiculturalism that strengthens
nationalism, xenophobia and racism). I will show that the European ‘unification
process’ is a very superficial one, probably as superficial as the theories that claim
to explain it.
The paper consists of two chapters and a section in which I expose my
conclusions. In the first chapter I introduce to the reader some of the theories and
strands of thought which attempt to explain current European international
relations and the ongoing processes of unification and uniformization on the
European continent. These accounts range from the rather broad interpretations of
the effects of globalization on Europe to the somewhat "narrower" approach of
those who see this same unification as a process by which the European Union, or,
the West, 'socializes' the Eastern European countries, thus creating a new
'European society' or an 'European identity'. I will point to the weaknesses of these
hypotheses and theories and explain why neither of them can give a satisfactory
explanation for, let alone predict, European politics at the threshold of the third
Millennium.
In the second part of the paper I elaborate on the sources of disunity in Europe by
pointing at the various aspects of 'the new Europe'. I will explain why the 'unity'
of Europe is a myth, rather than reality; why states and their citizens cannot give
up their various identities related to the nation state in return for a 'bigger', pan-
European one; why the political criteria for EU-membership, as they have been
4formulated at the European Council held in 1993 in Copenhagen, are not observed
by the members of the Union themselves; and finally, why history and linguistics
make this most ambitious project for European unification impossible.
I conclude my paper by asserting that the European Union is bound to collapse if
regulation continues to be regarded as a substitute for a strong leadership, possibly
meaning a European federal government. Only deregulation and a firm leadership,
or, the practice of "firm leadership, light rule" can make the European Union
succeed.
5CHAPTER I
Do Theories of International Relations Explain
Current European Politics?
1.1. Introductory remarks
“International Relations is a unique field because it studies abstract entities known
as states rather than individuals, and thus it requires its own methods of
investigation for which there is no book.”2
Somewhat puzzled by this statement which I found in the syllabus of my graduate
course in research methods, I asked for the opinion of another professor of
research methods to comment on it. His remarks were indeed enlightening:
“International Relations is not unique because other fields, including
sociology and economics, study abstract entities such as classes, ethnic
groups, consumers, producers and so forth. If the ‘unit of analysis’, or the
actor, is states, what is the use of relying on archives and open sources for
documents? After all, such sources are written or stated by individuals and
not states. We may use as a short-hand 'Turkey did this and Greece did
                                                          
2 Course syllabus for the graduate course in Research Methods, given in the fall semester
2000/2001 at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.
6that', but this is a convenience at best, and an obfuscation at worst –
obscuring that the actions of states are the outcomes of the actions of
individuals in groups. To make the state "real", to reify it by claiming that
it "acts", betrays either sloppiness or a mind beholden to etatism, and at the
extreme, fascism; that is, to suggest that the state exists outside of and
above the individuals who constitute it, is both analytically wrong and
politically dangerously undemocratic in its implications.”3
From Machiavelli to Morgenthau, the state (or, 'the prince', which can be
considered, under the circumstances, to be almost the same) has been the only
'unit of analysis' of relations among states. However, during the past two centuries
several other actors emerged on the 'international scene', from trade unions to non-
governmental organizations, from national and trans-national corporations to
prominent individuals. Hence, international politics became a field of the political
science which offers and requires increasingly more units and levels of analysis.
Most of the theories of international relations which I introduce in this chapter
disregard other actors on the international scene and 'fetishize' the state as if it
would exist, be peaceful or bellicose, democratic or undemocratic, independently
of the citizens which form it. This methodological deficiency of any theory of
international relations has to be born in mind when reading any text (just like this
one) dealing with international (meaning not exclusively inter-statal) relations.
                                                          
3 Pervin, David. Email of 25 November, 2000.
71.2. Realism
Realist theories of international relations assume that nation states are always
"power maximizing" and intrinsically "bad" (whereas the citizens and the state of
the Idealists are intrinsically "good"). Given the world of limited resources we live
in, the 'Realist state' always tries to increase its power to the disadvantage of other
states. Since the underlying assumption is that all states are "functionally the
same", war and conflict in the Realist paradigm are considered to be endemic.
However, after World War II, something unprecedented in European history
happened: Germany, the second most militarized state of Europe during the first
half of the 20th century (after France), suddenly 'decided' to allow other countries
to control its natural resources, thus limiting its sovereign rights over its own
industrial production. The country which suffered two humiliating defeats by the
Allied forces within less than three decades did not seek 'revenge', neither did it
seek a revision of the terms of the peace accords signed after WW II. One can
explain this through the massive presence of foreign occupation armies in
Germany, but still, the extent to which Germany suddenly became peaceful and
'silent' must have surprised many of those who embraced Realism.
From the creation of the European Community of Coal and Steel until the
introduction of the Euro, more than fifty years passed during which an increasing
8number of states followed Germany's example and delegated parts of their
sovereign rights to some supranational, 'European' bodies. In order to calm those
spirits which warned against the loss of national sovereignty to some remote
"capital of Europe", the builders of the European Community, and later, of the
European Union, introduced the new notion of "pooling sovereignty". States
suddenly did not lose, but increase their sovereignty, as if a state could be, for
instance, to 120 percent sovereign.
The military alliance of which most Western European countries became part after
WW II was meant to "balance" the expansionist reflexes of the Russo-Soviet
Empire. A military alliance of this sort could be backed best by the economic
sticks and carrots applied by the economically strongest country of the alliance.
The Marshall Plan, sponsored by the United States of America, gave the impulse
for more economic co-operation between the formerly belligerent countries of
Western Europe,  and guaranteed that the Western European states will later co-
operate in the balancing of the perceived threats posed by the Soviet Union. Such
state behavior during the Cold War could therefore be explained by Realist
theories of international relations. But do Realist theories account for the
continuation of the European unification processes after 1991?
The answer is, no. Even if one accepts that today we live in a multipolar world in
which the European Union struggles to be one such pole (and hence, struggles
against other poles), there is little to explain why the military or economic co-
9operation of European nation states should go beyond the provisions of the
Treaties of Brussels (1946), Washington (1949) or Rome (1957).
The signing of the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice did not improve
Western Europe's position in the world. On the one hand they revived old dreams
of a past Western European Union and thus will lead, sooner or later, to the
division of the most successful military alliance ever (namely NATO), and on the
other hand they laid down the framework for the creation of a highly centralized
European Union whose rulings nobody seems to be eager to obey. The European
Union is weakening the power of the national governments, the only political
bodies which have the means for enforcing laws or policies. The more recent
creation of the Euro and its immediate nearly-collapse does not seem to have a
dramatically positive effect on the new 'European economy' either.
And still, Europe is striving after an "ever closer union". Many states which have
been outside the EC/EU until now are eager to join the union of the most
prosperous countries in the world4. They all want to adopt the entire acquis
communautaire within only a few years (and thus take on the burdens which
derive from it), and give up increasingly large parts of their sovereignty, without,
however, being compelled to do so. At least in the case of most formerly
communist countries it seems as if the benefits would not even be comparable
with the medium-term high costs of European Union membership. Indeed, the
                                                          
4 if one considers the GDP/capita of the top-11 EU-member countries.
10
economic transformation processes in Eastern Europe are often handicapped by
the high stakes put forward by the Union for EU-membership.
The joining of any sort of international organizations, other than military
alliances, cannot be explained by Realism. International organizations self-
evidently put limits to the sovereignty of a state. Bearing in mind that we live in
an age of an  increased institutionalization of international relations (not only
political or military, but cultural, scientific and so forth), this is an anomaly which
the Realist theories of international relations cannot explain. Hence, I conclude,
there is an acute need today to find a paradigm, other than the Realist one, to
explain the current European politics aimed at 'unifying' the continent's peoples
under the lead of one international (however, not supranational) political
decisionmaking body, such as the European Union's Commission, Council, and
Parliament.
1.3. Globalization
A more usable interpretation of the current trend towards gradual European
unification is given by those who see 'globalization' as an unavoidable process,
(unavoidably) affecting Europe, just as it does affect any other region of the
globe. Markets and 'social spaces' are growing together, the promoters of the idea
say, just as the virtual space created by the rapid growth of internet connections is
uniting people from all around the world into one community of netsurfers,
11
chatters, email correspondents, online newspaper-readers, virtual game-players
and so forth. But let us wonder a little about this assumption. Empirical studies
have shown that the transactions about which the 'globalizers' assume to be global
are far from directly involving or affecting the entire world.
"84% of world trade is transacted between countries inhabited by
approximately 28% of the world population. This OECD focus is even
more evident if one looks at direct investments. Over 91% of all foreign
direct investments between 1980 and 1991 went to OECD countries and
the 10 most important threshold countries[...]. Communication flows
indicate a similar concentration in OECD countries. A world map showing
the distribution of Internet connections is particularly informative. It shows
that even within the OECD world there are clear gravitational centres
[…]"5
The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the joining of the "Free World" by the
formerly totalitarian  countries did not tremendously change this picture in
Europe. Hungary, for instance, a country with only ten million inhabitants but
with the largest proportion of foreign direct investment among the post-totalitarian
countries, absorbed "only" around 25 billion US dollars. Taken all together, the
post-totalitarian states, including the states which gained independence after the
demise of the Soviet Union, absorbed between 1990 and 2000 a total of FDI
roughly equaling the capital inflow into one developed country per year.
More than half of Europe's states are OECD-members (today including Hungary,
Poland and the Czech Republic), and thus, belong to the group of states which
experience very rapid capital flows among each other and which have created the
                                                          
5 Hirst, Paul and Thompson, Grahame. Globalization in Question. The International Economy and
the Possibilities of Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.  and Beisheim et al.  Im
Zeitalter der Globalisierung? Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen und politischen
Denationalisierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999. Both sources quoted in Zürn, Michael.
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most developed and fastest growing net of communication infrastructure. But the
assumption that these processes are global, and therefore affect Europe as well, is
wrong. It is rather Europe, together with some remoter single countries such as the
United States of America, Japan or some states of the Southeastern Pacific region,
which started this process and which try to involve as many regions as possible
for the satisfaction of their own economic and political interests. A closer look at
the geographical situation of the OECD countries speaks for itself: 21 are located
in Europe, 3 in Asia (including Turkey), 3 on the pan-American continent, and 2
in Oceania-Australia. There is no OECD member state in Africa6.
Also, there is little reason to believe that such (economic) 'globalization' is a
novelty for Europe. Economic exchanges between the different regions and
countries of Europe on the one hand, and Asian or African countries on the other
hand, started early in the Middle Ages, when trade in silk, spices or other largely
luxury products brought European traders as far as the Middle East or China.
Even the Roman Empire of two thousand years ago stretched far into extra-
European lands and traded with remoter peoples and their states. The fact that
more and more scholars talk about globalization in the economic realm today is
therefore linked to the perception of this phenomenon by what is commonly called
'the West'. It is our (Western) perception of the relative decline of the formerly
colonizer European cultures, or, of the ’Western civilization’ in general, and, the
emergence and the rapidly growing economic strength of a few other regions of
                                                                                                                                                              
Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other International Institutions.
European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 6, No. 2, 183-221. London-Munich, 2000. 187.
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the world in particular, that makes us think that 'globalization' is a relatively new
phenomenon. The 'globalization' of economic processes at the beginning of the
21st century has therefore no distinctive qualities apart from a sheer extension of
scale.
'Globalization' is still far from becoming global indeed. With the sole exception of
the Southeast Asian region, no other region is involved yet into this largely Euro-
Atlantic process.
If the term globalization stands for the emergence of natural phenomena which
cause global effects (for instance, the greenhouse effect or the pollution of the air,
the waters and the soil of our planet), the term can be used, again, only with the
required care. The biggest polluters today are the developed industrial nations, all
of which are members of the OECD, and thus, represent only 1/6 of the world's
countries and approximately the same share of the Earth's population. It is this
same group of countries which, for understandable reasons, tries to find a solution
to these harmful  phenomena. The fact that they do it under the calling of 'global
problems' which require 'global action' is obviously intended to obscure the size of
their share in the responsibility of causing them.
Although increasing in their significance and relevance for the study of
international relations, organized crime, terrorism, massive migration flows or
                                                                                                                                                              
6 information taken from OECD in Figures 2000 Edition: Statistics on Member Countries. (The
Web Edition can be found at http://www.oecdwash.org/DATA/online.htm). OECD Publications.
Editor: Rory Clarke.
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'global' illnesses are still processes which are limited to a relatively small number
of states and are therefore far from producing global effects.
As a conclusion it can be said that it is not what we call today 'globalization' that
furthers or explains the "ever closer union" of Europe. On the contrary, it is this
European unification process, paralleled by the growing together of the remoter
developed world, which makes us believe that economic globalization is indeed
global. Today there is no 'global pressure' on Europe which would explain the
unification of the European continent under the lead of the supranational bodies
created by the Treaty on the European Union.
1.4. Democratic Peace Theory and Economic Interdependence Theory
Some scholars of international relations assert that there is a link between
democracy at the domestic level and peace (or again, democracy) on the
international level. They say that if a state is governed by the principles of
democracy at the national level, its foreign policy must also be conducted
according to the same principles. The underlying assumption is that democracies
do not use violence within their borders and against each other, but solve their
disagreements through peaceful methods of conflict resolution.
Bruce Russett, a democratic peace theorist, believes that in an international
system comprising a "critical mass" of democratic states, "it may be possible in
15
part to supersede the 'Realist' principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states)
that have dominated practice to the exclusion of 'liberal' or 'idealist' ones since at
least the seventeenth century"7. In another article (published the same year),
however, the same author states plainly that "democratic states are in general as
conflict- and war-prone as nondemocracies." In order to make this incongruence
between his assumptions about how democratic peace works even more
complicated, he adds later in that same article that, however, "democracies have
rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict"8.
Russett explains this anomaly by resorting to a series of 'cases' (or 'facts'),
processed through sophisticated quantitative methods which seem to support and
'explain' his thesis that if there are more democracies, then there is more peace,
and especially, since nowadays there are more democracies than ever, there is
more peace today. He concludes that the various states have most probably chosen
to become democratic, because they realized that 'peace at home' means 'peace in
the world'.
A very usable critique of the theory of democratic peace is given by Christopher
Layne, who concludes, by resorting to a number of four 'cases' only, that "realism
is superior to democratic peace theory as a predictor of international outcomes".
"Liberal international relations theory is based on hope, not on facts", he asserts.
                                                          
7 Russett, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. chap. 7; and Russett, Bruce. Can a Democratic Peace
Be Built? International Interactions. Vol. 18, No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 277-282. Quoted in Layne,
Christopher. The Myth of Democratic Peace. International Security. Vol. 19, No. 2 (5-49) pp. 5
8 Maoz, Zeev and Russett Bruce. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-
1986. American Political Science Review. Vol. 87, No. 3, September 1993 (624-638) pp. 624.
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The "zone of peace" created by democratic states such as Germany or Japan is a
"peace of illusions". Layne argues that there is no evidence that would explain the
mechanisms through which democracy at the state level can be 'elevated' onto the
international level, if our main assumption of the state is that it always seeks to
increase its security and power to the disadvantage of other states9.
"Similarly", Layne argues, "there is no evidence that supports the sister theory that
economic interdependence leads to peace". And indeed, there are many cases in
European history which prove that economic interdependence does not stop
countries from waging wars against each other. Moreover, economically
interdependent countries have clashed with each other in war several times in 20th
century European history exactly because they were economically dependent of
each other.
The main reason for the inapplicability of these two theories is that both
democratic peace and economic interdependence cannot work in an environment
in which states act 'selfishly'. As one author suggests: "nationalism is the most
successful political ideology in human history". And nationalism, by definition,
works against any forms of international cooperation which in their costs go
beyond the benefits which such cooperation would entail to the states in question.
And still, it is the 'national interest' of the world's most powerful state to spread
the myth of democratic peace in the world. More democracy in the world serves
                                                          
9 Layne, Christopher. The Myth of Democratic Peace. International Security. Vol. 19, No. 2 (5-49)
pp. 47.
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the interests of the United States, it is said. "Policymakers who have embraced
democratic peace theory see a crucial link between America's security and the
spread of democracy, which is viewed as the antidote that will prevent future
wars"10. Democratic peace theory can therefore be seen as the theory of the rich
against the poor: it is the rich West, led by the United States, which has the
legitimate 'right' to conceptualize democracy, and it is the poorer countries which
have the 'choice' to obey and adopt this ideology and its principles, even though
these principles are very often alien to their culture or history, and although their
introduction may cause more harm and national schizophrenia than benefits. The
Copenhagen criteria for accession to the European Union, and especially, the
various legal formulations of human rights are the best examples for this.
Democratic peace theory does not explain why the countries of Europe tend to
strengthen their co-operation with each other without, however, creating a federal
state system similar to the one of the United States of America. Indeed, conflicts
between the EU-member states become increasingly serious as the European
Union moves towards an "ever closer union". To be sure, these conflicts do not
result in wars in the classical meaning of the word. But, for instance, the 'political
embargo' imposed on Austria after the election of Jorg Haider as governor of
Carinthia, and especially, after his party's joining the Austrian coalition
government, shows clearly that the critical threshold between co-operation and
interference in domestic affairs has been reached within the EU.
                                                          
10 Layne, Christopher. The Myth of Democratic Peace. International Security. Vol. 19, No. 2 (5-
49) pp. 5.
18
Democracy is a concept strictly related to the nation state. There cannot be a
democracy among states. Democracy and the rule of law can be enforced within
the state through the specific means which are at the disposal of the state. Hence,
as long as there is no supranational authority which has the means to enforce the
rule of international law, democratic peace, or, democracy at the international
level (if there is such an international democracy at all), will not work.
Finally, democracy at the state level can be at most a necessary condition for
international peace. Democracy is in no way a sufficient condition for peaceful
foreign policies. Other factors, such as trust, solidarity, reciprocal respect or a
sense of fairness are the prerequisites for peaceful international relations. Since,
however, it is not, and it cannot be, the states who "act", it is up to their leaders
whether their foreign policy is conducted peacefully or not. In other words,
democratic peace theory works in Europe only if the leaders of Europe's nation
states want it to work. Hence, I conclude, democratic peace theory is nothing
more than one of the formulations of Western wishful thinking about a peaceful
future of our world.
1.5. Denationalization
In order to save theories from being dismissed as invalid because of possibly
wrong assumptions, scholars of international relations resort to all sorts of
linguistic acrobatics. Thus, instead of using the term 'globalization', some authors
19
started using the term 'denationalization', standing for the “extension of social
spaces”, “an indication of the weakening link between territorial states and their
corresponding national societies, that is, the contextual condition that made the
national constellation possible”11. Put differently, if one speaks of
denationalization, he assumes the increase of international transactions, without,
however, assuming the global nature of these phenomena.
The main assumption of the "denationalizers" is that more and more decisions
made by decision makers in one state affect a number of citizens in another state.
Therefore, they say, the emergence of international institutions is a solution to
these sort of democratic deficits at the inter-national level. The emergence of
"denationalized governance structures" helps, it is said, to bring all the actors who
are affected by a decision into the decision-making system. This means, in this
particular case, that the European Union emerged as an increasingly supranational
body in order to solve this growing incongruence between the political, economic
and social spaces of the nation state.
The problem with this approach is that it does not account for, or simply ignores,
the emergence of a similar democratic deficit at the supranational institutional
level. Supranational bodies, such as the European Commission, the European
Council or the members of the European Court of Justice are neither elected
through direct popular vote, nor checked by any other elected body, nor are they
accountable. The so-much desired trans-European democratic space is thus
                                                          
11 Zuern, Michael. Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other
International Institutions. European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2000.
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becoming increasingly undemocratic, and hence, the theory of denationalization
unusable, if one accepts the underlying assumption that international institutions
are created in order to solve the problem of the various democratic deficits.
There are two strands of thought regarding this problem of legitimacy and
democratic deficit at the international institutional level, particularly in relation to
the European Union and its institutions. The first asserts plainly that these
questions can be adjusted through thorough reforms, provided there exists the
right political will. One can argue that this is currently happening in the EU after
the recent summit in Nice, where reforms in the responsibilities of the various
EU-bodies, and, most importantly, in the various voting systems, have been
adopted. The tendency is to strengthen the prerogatives of the (elected) Parliament
to the detriment of the (appointed) Commission, and, to introduce the principle of
majority voting in supranational bodies such as the Commission or the Council.
The other strand of thought dismisses the chances for more democracy within
Europe altogether for the simple reason that the European Union, just as any other
international institution, "cannot meet the social prerequisites for democracy",
among which the congruence of the social and political spaces, as described
above, is the most prominent. The lack of a common language, or, the ever-
stronger inclination of Europeans to engage in a sort of linguistic warfare within
the European Union, is only one major obstacle to the creation of a genuine
political community, or, a demos. Consequently, the Eurosceptics argue, there is a
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zero-sum relationship between nationality (or, in a broader context, national
sovereignty) and supranationality.
However, theory is always ahead of reality. A German scholar, one of the
promoters of the concept of 'denationalization' instead of globalization, challenges
the Eurosceptics and tries to prove that, although there is no European demos
today ("not yet"), there already exist different components of it. "The very strong
claim of the sceptics that there is no demos beyond national borders needs
differentiation. Only by deconstructing the all-embracing term demos can it be
established what element of a demos is required for what component of
democracy, and the validity of the sceptics' statement thus be tested"12
This deconstruction of the demos resulted, however, in the vague formulation of
five attributes of the (Western) European demos, all of which proved, in the end,
to be rather non-existent in the EU-space (in the author’s words: "more empirical
studies are needed on this issue"). For instance, to assume that the very existence
of the EU’s Regional and Structural Funds reflects a sort of solidarity among
Western Europeans is a naive assumption about how the allocation of these funds
is negotiated in Brussels. Surprisingly, the author himself admits that today there
is “no sense of transnational social obligations” in Europe (of course, except in
calamity situations - and therefore only with ad-hoc character). But what, if not
solidarity, characterizes best a political community, or a demos? The author goes
as far as to claim that it might even be possible that trans-European solidarity is
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not a necessary attribute of a trans-European demos (as if it would exist), and thus
not necessary to the democratization of the European Union.
If 'denationalization' means the existence of cross-border transactions involving
goods, capital, services and labour force, then the term can be accepted as an
alternative to 'globalization' with the emphasis on the regional, rather than the
global, effects of these economic transactions. Then, we can say that the European
unification process is the result of the 'denationalization' of the formerly national
'economic spaces'. If, however, denationalization stands for the dissolution of the
national societies and their blending into a larger, international one, the term does
not reflect current European realities and it must be therefore dismissed as
unusable. The centralized European decision making bodies did not 'fill' the
democratic deficits at the supranational level, and thus, they did not make the
European Union a more democratic space. Therefore, if 'denationalization' means
the creation of supranational bodies which can solve the incongruence of national
sovereignties in the political and economic realm, and thus, create a more
democratic decisionmaking system, the term must be considered, again, with the
appropriate criticism.
1.6. The Clash of Civilizations
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A rather controversial explanation for, among others, both the strengthening and
the enlargement of European international organizations, is given by those who
believe that following the demise of the bipolar world, the 'new world order' will
be a multipolar one, however, this time divided along so-called civilizational
border lines. The most prominent among the embracers of this theory is Harvard
professor Samuel P. Huntington, who, in his famous, but not less controversial
book on The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order attempts to
explain post-1991 global international politics from his own "civilizational" point
of view13.
Huntington says that civilization is "the highest cultural grouping of people and
the broadest level of cultural identity people have, short of that which
distinguishes humans from other species"14. He asserts that it is this highest level
of identity that matters most to people at the end of the twentieth century.
Civilizations are said to 'unite' and strengthen their forces against the perceived
threats coming from other such civilizations.
Huntington considers religion to be the most important component of what he
calls a civilization. Religion is the basis for his identification of the nine such
civilizations living on our globe. However, if there is a "Western civilization"
which ends (in Europe) at the borderline between Western and Eastern
Christianity, the inclusion into the European Union of Greece, and at a future date,
                                                          
13 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996 .
14 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. pp. 52.
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of Cyprus, Romania or Bulgaria or other Western Balkan countries would not
make sense. At least Bulgaria is not a “torn country” in the Huntingtonian
meaning. Also, the possible future inclusion of Turkey into the Union would make
even less sense15.
Huntington’s theory, that states belonging to the same civilization ‘revolve’
around the leader state of that civilization does not explain why the European
Union increasingly distances herself from the United States of America: the
Monetary Union, the CSFP, and most importantly, the ESDI and EDP make
European politics increasingly European and less and less American. The
European Union divides this assumed "Western civilization" rather than uniting it,
while, on the other side of the Atlantic, the US seems to be more and more
involved (economically, politically) in the Central and Southern American states,
thus creating a "new", pan-American 'civilization'. Europe and America start
having different allies, too: whereas the European Union is becoming the largest
sponsor of the new Palestinian Authority, the US remains a staunch ally of Israel.
The conflict between Europe and the US caused by the American decision to
build the planned missile defense system, or, not to ratify the Kyoto agreement
(1997) on air-pollution in spite of vehement European protests (voiced together
with Japan!), are further signals for the division line which seems to emerge in the
middle of this assumed "Western civilization".
                                                          
15 Huntington calls Turkey a 'torn country' although it is a country with a 98% Muslim population.
All the other 'torn countries', however, are 'torn' in Huntington's view because of the existence
within their borders of two or more relatively large religious groups. The reasons for this
inconsistency is that Huntington obviously did not know where to 'put', because this is what his
theory is about, Turkey, due to its predominantly Muslim religion and its being embedded into
several Western organizations at the same time.
25
Abraham Maslow's 'theory of the hierarchy of needs' challenges Huntington's
civilizations-theory  and asserts that some 'basic' identities, other than cultural or
'civilizational', loom larger when people think about themselves and their place in
the world16. And indeed, economic prosperity or poverty, technological
development and underdevelopment created a far more important division of our
globe than any other 'civilizational' line. The OECD, whose members belong to
six different Huntingtonian 'civilizations', seems to create a far more important
division of the globe than any other 'civilizational' line. The rich and the poor, the
North and the South will remain the dichotomies that will create identity in the
future.
As a conclusion I say that Huntington's civilizations-theory does not explain the
institutional growing together of Europe. It does not explain why the West, thus
far being led by the US, is being increasingly divided by an imaginary line drawn
through the Atlantic, nor does it account for the inclusion into "Europe" of non-
Western countries such as Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and so forth. And finally, it
does not explain the increasingly strong co-operation between the countries of the
                                                          
16 Abraham Maslow is known for establishing the theory of a hierarchy of needs, writing that
human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs, and that certain lower needs need to be satisfied
before higher needs can be satisfied. Bearing in mind that most of our fellow humans live in
poverty if not misery, I conclude that our basic needs (i.e. access to food and shelter, or having a
job) and the identities which derive from them (being poor or unemployed) are more important to
us than our cultural needs or our 'civilizational' identity. For further readings on Abraham Maslow
and his theory of a hierarchy of needs, see http://web.utk.edu/~gwynne/maslow.HTM
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developed world, which, if we consider only the thirty members of the OECD,
belong to six different 'civilizations'.17
1.7. International Socialization
After the collapse of the autoritarian systems in Europe, the Western European
countries 'decided' (for the purpose of increasing the legitimacy of their shared
'beliefs and values') to 'socialize' the Eastern European countries through an
already existing web of international institutions. 'Socialization' was meant to
stand for the transmission of Western-type liberal democracy, human rights and
the principles of market economy to the Eastern European countries. Thus,
through this uniformization of Europe at the ideological, and later, economic
level, a new European identity, a strong 'fortress Europe' was to be created.
(Western) Europe is the most highly institutionalized region of the international
system. If we assume that institutions create norms, which are either the effect of,
or the cause for, the emergence of common 'values and beliefs', it is plausible to
assume that the extension of membership of these institutions will lead to, or is
the effect of, the existence of these same common 'values and beliefs' in the state
to be 'socialized'. Arguably, the question arises what came first? The institution
which created norms, which in turn created common 'values and beliefs'? Or was
                                                          
17 it is also worth noting that (at least) two of these countries are 'leaders' of their respective
'civilizations' –  hence, their co-operation is (another) "anomaly" which Huntington could not
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it the common 'values and beliefs' which created the institutions, which in turn
reinforced these 'values and beliefs' through norms? For the purpose of explaining
how the 'socialization' of Eastern Europe by the West could possibly work, the
promoters of this idea of intra-European 'socialization' consider only the first
explanation. By doing so they go as far in their arrogance as to claim that
'European socialization' does work only in one way, from West to East, as if the
Eastern half of the continent would not 'socialize' the West as well – if not by
other means, then through the export of organized crime, corruption, Eastern
European illegal immigrants with their Eastern ("old fashioned", "communist")
mentalities, in brief: with their Eastern European 'values and beliefs'.
There are two approaches to this theory of socialization, a 'rationalist
institutionalist' and a 'sociological institutionalist' one. Some rationalist
institutionalist theorists assume that "socialization is one of the processes by
which states become alike and by which nonconformist states adapt to the
exigencies of Realpolitik"18. States are forced "to conform to successful
practices", however, not by a hegemon, but by the inherent conditions of an
anarchical state system. Other rationalists assume that socialization "comes about
primarily in the wake of the coercive exercise of power"19. Whatever the
motivations of the nonconformist state for conforming are, rationalists assume
that the decision 'to socialize', and the decision to 'let oneself be socialized', is a
rational action of the "socializing agency" and the "secondary state", respectively.
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18 Schimmelfennig, Frank. International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an
Institutional Environment. European Journal of International Relations. Vol 6, No. 1. March 2000.
(109-139) pp. 113.
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This rational action, we are told, stems from the technical and anarchical
environment in which the states exist.
On the opposite side, those theorists who embrace the sociological institutionalist
point of view, start their theorizing from the assumption of the existence of an
institutional environment (which exists just like that), in which the actions of
states are governed by norms rather than by rationality. These theorists see the
effectiveness of the 'socialization process' in the degree of internalization of the
new 'values and beliefs' by the individuals of the secondary state.
Both approaches have flaws. For instance, if rationalist theorists assume that
states act selfishly and in an instrumental way in an environment of anarchy, then
there is no point in assuming that 'international socialization' is possible at all.
Because, after all, such 'socialization' presupposes the internalization of other,
often non-Realist and even non-rational principles of social order. A pre-set, pre-
assumed Realpolitik-based state behavior is not compatible with the assumption
that states can change their behavior driven by reasons other than power.
The problem with the sociological-institutionalist viewpoint is that it takes the
existence of international institutions for granted, and hence, does not explain how
they come into being. As a consequence, the other way round, it does not explain
the mechanisms through which the geographical extension of international
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organizations leads to the internalization of the new principles in the so-called
secondary states.
There have been attempts to "unify" these two viewpoints due to the supposedly
'underinstitutionalized' nature of the rationalist model on the one hand, and the
often 'oversocialized' nature of the sociological one. One scholar came up with the
hybrid theory of "rational action in a normatively institutional environment", that
is, he blended the technical and institutional environments, the rational, power-
maximizing state-actor with the rule-following state-actor, and so forth. While
doing so, he produced a show of linguistic acrobatics which make the two
underlying approaches even more unintelligible, and seemingly (at least)
nonsensical:
"I [thereby] do not claim that all state actors act selfishly and
instrumentally at all times, i.e. never pursue a moral goal for its own sake,
are never truly committed to the rules and norms of international society,
or never internalize international norms personally. The reason for sticking
to rationalist assumptions is rather pragmatic. If it is possible to show that
international socialization in the new Europe can be explained on the
assumption that all actors act rationally – and empirical observations show
that many of them do – then , by subsumption, we may conclude that it
can be explained even more easily if some actors are rule-followers."20
Whether it is a rational action, or an action stemming from institutional
constraints or the coercive powers of a stronger state, "international socialization"
does not work. There is no evidence that proves that Eastern European states
(meaning both leaders and populations) consciously accepted  or "internalized"
the principles of democracy and liberalism and therefore wish to join the
European Union. Conversely, there is no way to find out whether the extension of
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membership to the Eastern European countries means indeed that the
internalization of the West's 'values and beliefs' will happen at all. After all, at the
referenda, through which Eastern Europeans will declare their willingness to join
the EU, the prospective EU-citizens will vote favorably in order to profit from the
prosperity guaranteed by EU-membership, rather than driven by some, maybe
completely alien, Western European 'values and beliefs'. Also, it is a naive if not
an arrogant assumption that such 'socialization', if it works at all, cannot work the
other way, from East to West. Therefore, I conclude, the 'theory of international
socialization' cannot explain pan-European politics at the beginning of the 21st
century.
1.8. Conclusion
Today's theories of international relations do have the potential to explain current
European politics. However, just as in all other fields of the social science, they
do so only after the event and under specific circumstances, in a specific context.
Theories of international relations are not too much more than bold
generalizations based on certain ‘cases’, or, certain historical ‘facts’, which seem
to confirm those very theories.
The ‘fetishization’ of the historical surface fact, as it is done by the discipline of
international relations or political contemporary history, does not further, but
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obstruct, the political scientist in understanding the main object of his analysis:
the relations among states. Many historians fell prey to this practice, starting from
Leopold von Ranke in the last century and ending (?) with those whom the
implosion of the Soviet Union in the late eighties took by surprise. The
demascation of the ‘historical fact’, as it was done by E.H. Carr in his lectures on
What is History?21, should have been a lesson to those who limited their research
to collecting a number of ‘facts’ and support their theories by resorting to them.
Unfortunately, today there is still a tendency among political scientists and
scholars of international relations to disregard the useful potential of the other
social sciences, such as history (cultural, intellectual, and so forth), anthropology,
sociology, economics, psychology, the study of nationalism or folklore and so
forth, in explaining, or maybe predicting, socio-political processes.
What is common to all the theoretical approaches which I criticized in this chapter
is that their assumptions and prescriptions are, in the best case, applicable to one
specific country or region and to one specific and relatively short historical period
only. These theories, be it Huntington’s civilization-theory or democratic peace,
globalization or political realism, are far from being universally applicable. They
are contextual and reflect nothing more and nothing less than the way how the
scholars who formulated them think about the geographical, historical, economic
or social context in which they live themselves. One may claim, that
historiography is as subjective and contextual as the discipline of international
relations theory. The difference is, however, that the authors of written history do
                                                          
21 Carr, Edward Hallett. What is History? London: Penguin Books, c1987.
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not try to prognosticate the future, whereas theorists of international relations tend
to use (and abuse) history to support their often nonsensical predictions.
CHAPTER II
European Politics at the Beginning of the 21st Century
2.1. What is Europe?
 Europe is a relatively modern idea, having its roots in the early seventeenth
century. It emerged following the religious conflicts of the preceding centuries
and was intended to replace the concept of Christendom, a religious community
now divided by a Great Schism and several Reformations.
However, 'Europe' is above all a legend and a myth. In the European history of
divisions it was aimed at 'uniting' the continent's peoples and thus guarantee a
long lasting pan-European peace.22 This myth of European unity, which at the
                                                          
22 To be sure, 'Europe' was not meant to unite all European peoples in one state, under the lead of
one sovereign. This 'unification' was rather a sort of a slogan, such as the "Proletariat of the World,
Unite!" one. As such, this unification was rather nonsensical because nobody ever explained how
such a unification could possibly work. Vaclav Havel talks about this sort of 'spiritual unification'
(however, in a different context) in his brilliant essay on The Power of the Powerless. See: Havel,
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same time became a dream, and nowadays, a project, was in the beginning an idea
pursued by groups of poets, artists and other intellectuals during the
Enlightenment. As early as 1751, Voltaire described 'Europe' as being "a kind of a
great republic divided into several states, some monarchical, the others mixed...
but all corresponding with one another. They all have the same religious
foundation, even if divided into several confessions. They all have the same
principle of public law and politics, unknown in other parts of the world."23
Twenty years later Jean-Jacques Russeau celebrated that "there are no longer
Frenchmen, Germans and Spaniards, or even English, but only Europeans."24 Ever
since, the "sameness" of Europe and Europeans became a sort of an obsession to
those who saw "otherness" as a threat to this new creation called Europe.
Right after its emergence, 'Europe' was 'threatened' by the Porte from the outside,
and by other 'non-Europeans' (meaning basically non-Christians) from the inside.
The peoples of Europe joined forces to expel the Ottoman hordes from Central
and Southeastern Europe, just as they did some centuries earlier with the Moors
and the Jews, who have been killed in pogroms, expelled, or forcefully
assimilated through baptism.
It has to be said that many outcasts conformed "voluntarily" to Europe and
propagated the usefulness of baptism among their brothers in belief, thus
contributing to the creation of the myth of a united and Christian 'Europe'.
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23 quoted by Davies, Norman. Europe – A History. London: Pimlico, 1997, pp. 7.
24 quoted by Davies, Norman. Europe – A History. London: Pimlico, 1997, pp. 7.
34
Heinrich Heine, for instance, who was born a Jew, converted to Lutheran
Protestantism in 1825 and until his death three decades later celebrated baptism as
the "entrance ticket to European culture".25 Unfortunately for him, he could
neither 'enter' European culture with this entry ticket during his lifetime, nor did
he learn what exactly European culture was. Because, after all, European culture
in Heine's times was not that European (Christian) as he believed it to be: the
Muslims in the Southeast, and to a far larger degree, the Jews in the West and
North of Europe, were important dwellers and builders of urban Europe, too.
Strictly linked to the creation of the cultural and religious borders of 'Europe', the
concept of Europe acquired a geographical delineation as well. Whereas most of
Europe's outline was already determined by the sea-coasts to its North, West and
South, the Eastern border was pushed East- and Southwards as the Ottoman
Empire withdrew, up to its dissolution in 1918. Early in the nineteenth century a
nation state emerged in the South of the Balkan Peninsula which became known
in Europe as 'the cradle of European (and hence, Christian!) civilization', through
its assumed direct descent from what is called today ancient Greece. Thus,
although even today there are many voices which deny "Europeanness" to most of
the Balkan countries (including Greece), and very often it is these peoples
themselves who, although they form largely Christian nations, regard themselves
as being non-Europeans26, Europe' seems to have acquired vast territories,
                                                          
25 Gidal, Nachum. Jews in Germany. From Roman Times to the Weimar Republic. Koeln:
Koenemann, 1998, pp. 269.
26 In her recently published book, Maria Todorova explains how some peoples in the Balkans
relate themselves to Europe. According to her research and experience, many peoples in the
Balkans do not consider themselves to be Europeans. See Todorova, Maria. Balcanii si
balcanismul. Bucuresti: Humanitas, 2000, chapter one ("Balcanii").
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stretching  as far South and East as the Turkish Straits and the Eastern
Mediterranean. Cyprus, an island which is less than one hundred sea miles from
the Syrian, Lebanese or Israeli coasts (and more than 500 miles far from Greece),
is considered to be today, both culturally and geographically, a part of Europe27.
Cyprus is 'European' (in the religious and cultural meaning) and hence eligible for
EU-membership, while Morocco, a country which is much closer to mainland
Europe, was denied EC/EU membership in 1986 on the grounds that it is not
European (geographically, and in any other respect). To be sure, this happened
notwithstanding the fact that "one could easily spin a story of how the
cohabitation of Roman Catholics and Moors in Spain up to 1492, the trade ties
across the Mediterranean, the years of French colonial administration, and so on,
make up a common history by dint of which Morocco should be seen as a member
of a human collective referred to, for example, as Europe."28
Although questions such as Cyprus's, Turkey's or even Morocco's being European
or not are important, the cardinal problem since the emergence of the concept of
Europe as a substitute for a disintegrated Christianity has been whether Russia
should be included into, or should rather be excluded from, 'Europe'. In the
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century, Russia's borders shifted westwards
into what was formerly (a Western Christian) Poland-Lithuania, and later, into
                                                          
27 The Treaty of Rome (1957) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) stipulate that only
(geographically) European states can join the European Communities and the European Union,
respectively. However, Cyprus is an officially recognized EU-accession candidate today. For
further readings on the problematic of Cyprus's future EU-accession see Axt, Heinz-Juergen.
Zypern und der "Acquis politique": Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der Perspektive des EU-
Beitritts einer geteilten Insel. Suedosteuropa Mitteilungen, 39. Jahrgang, 1999/4, pp. 319-333.
28 Neumann, Iver B. European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus.
Alternatives: Social Transformation & Humane Governance. Jul-Sep 1998, Vol. 23 Issue 3, pp.
399.
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Poland. Although contacts and exchanges between 'Europe', having in the
meanwhile acquired the meaning of "Western-Christian Europe", and Russia
started becoming more and more significant in scale, the autocratic, Orthodox and
economically backward Russian Empire continued being regarded by most
neighbors to its West as non-European, both culturally and geographically.
Interestingly, it was exactly in this historical period that Catherine the Great
announced that "Russia is a European Empire", notwithstanding Russia’s
stretching Eastwards as far as Alaska, through many Asian lands inhabited by a
majority of non-Christian, non-indo-European peoples. Ever since, Slavophiles
and Westerners in Russia try to convince each other and the world about Russia's
place on the map of the Eurasian continent, as if it were Russia herself, and not
the limits of an imaginary 'Europe', which can be adjusted much easier.
Today, what seems to loom largest when defining Europe is neither a shared
culture, or, a shared religion, nor is it a shared geography. European politics today
suggest that it is not a shared history either. The columnist of The Economist
recently put it in a straightforward statement: "Forget geography, forget culture.
The thing called 'Europe' the ex-communist and other countries want to join [...] is
about politics and economics."29 'Europe' has acquired a new meaning at the
threshold of the twenty-first century and lost most of its cultural, religious and
historical content: Europe means an economically prosperous 'West', while, by
implication, the East of the continent is non-European and backward. Just like
that.
                                                          
29 What is Europe? The Economist. 12 February 2000. pp. 13-14.
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The shift in the meanings of 'Europe' has happened during the four and a half
decades long European Cold War, when, by simply calling the European
Communities "European" (and not, for instance, "Western European"), the
countries belonging to the EC/EU acquired the monopoly in 'operationalizing' the
concept of 'Europe' and establishing the standards of 'Europeanness' for the next
decades, maybe centuries, to come. The common feature of any standard is,
however, that it is constructed by us, humans, and therefore it can also be changed
if we consider it necessary. The shifting meanings of 'Europe', from a religious-
cultural community to a politico-economic organization centered in the West of
the European continent stand as a proof for this. But why do we need today trans-
European standards of 'Europeanness' at all?
Europe has become during the Cold War a sort of "a magic formula, a moral
concept"30. After forty-five years of division, during which the 'West' meant
'Europe' (European Community, the Council of Europe, the European
Community of Coal and Steel, and so forth) and the rest was called "the Soviet
Bloc", 'Europe' became a synonym for success, freedom, prosperity, democracy,
peace, solidarity and the good in general. Now it is this myth of Europe's endemic
goodness which is required "to create a Golden Age' while repressing the dark
side of European history"31. Because, after all, this dark side is not so far back in
contemporary European history: it is the 20th century and not any other period in
                                                          
30 Puntscher Riekmann, Sonja. The Myth of European Unity. In  Myths and Nationhood. Hosking,
Geoffrey and George Schoepflin Ed. London: Hurst and Company, 1997. 60-71. pp. 64.
31 Puntscher Riekmann, Sonja. The Myth of European Unity. In  Myths and Nationhood. Hosking,
Geoffrey and George Schoepflin Ed. London: Hurst and Company, 1997. 60-71. pp. 65
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European history that one author calls emphatically "das Zeitalter der
Massenmoerder"32.
The myth of 'Europe' is "fed" by Europeans living in both the West and the East of
the European continent. The 'Wessies' use it to distance themselves from the
poverty and 'barbarism' of the Easterners, while the Eastern Europeans use it to
distance themselves from their fellow Easterners in their quest to get a more
prominent place in their so much desired "return to Europe". As if the communist
theories which created the system in which they lived would not have been born
in Europe, or, if one wants to be very accurate, in Western Europe.33
The end of the Cold War brought changes to Europe which we did not even dare
dreaming about, both to the East and to the West of the river Oder. Ever since,
Europe (and 'Europe') is changing at increased speed. This is also why the author
of the aforementioned article in The Economist hurries to add that "Europe's
political and economic order is by no means settled. It is shifting, and more
rapidly than would have seemed likely even five years ago. So pronounced is the
recent change in fact that one may even question how distinctively European this
Europe will seem in, say, another five years"34. The recent EU-summit in Helsinki
confirms the idea that 'Europe' is nowadays becoming increasingly non-European
in the traditional (religious, cultural, geographic) sense of the word. Turkey has
                                                          
32 Voss, Dirk Hermann. Bilanz des 20. Jahrhunderts – Das Zeitalter der Massenmoerder.
Paneuropa. Vol 23, No. 3, 2000. pp. 5-12.
33 Karl Marx was born in Trier, in the German Rhineland, in 1818.  Friedrich Engels was born in
the Rhineland town of Barmen, which lies just east of Duesseldorf in the industrial region of the
Ruhr.
34 What is Europe? The Economist. 12 February 2000. pp. 13-14
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been granted EU-membership candidate status. Similarly, Cyprus is a candidate
for EU-membership since 1997. A number of so-called Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries35, including Romania and Bulgaria, all having had
communist governments up to 1989, are hurrying to join the European Union and
other international organizations of the West. At the same time, "the
Americanization of European culture is not just a paranoia of French politicians, it
is indeed reality"36: European culture, if there is such a culture at all, is getting
increasingly non-European and increasingly American through American film,
pop-music, cheap literature and hamburgers. Finally, 'globalization', at least the
'globalization' of the cyberspace created by the Internet, seems to have a serious
impact upon European cultures and societies.
In the next section I will explain this shift in the meaning of 'Europe', and
'operationalize', to use an unlovely term, the concepts of Europe, Europeanness,
European identity, and so forth, at the beginning of the 21st century.
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2.2. What is 'Europe' today?
After the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes, one can hear more
and more often statements celebrating the 'West' as the winner over the 'East' of
Europe: "As a result of the delegitimization of communism, the West was able to
establish its liberal order as the new standard of legitimacy for all of Europe"37.
Or: "The new Europe is founded on the Western community's liberal values and
norms of domestic and international conduct. It is covered by a web of
international organizations whose activities are based on this cultural and
normative foundation."38 Indeed, the West, meaning in this particular case the
European Union, seems to have appropriated the right to 'operationalize' the
concept of Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. But it is through its
political and economic might, rather than through the winner-ideologies of liberal
democracy, that the European Union can impose its policies and its 'European'
name with ease upon both EU-member and non-EU-member countries.
A sort of 'economic bandwagoning' characterizes Europe at the beginning of the
21st century, where the bandwagon is the European Union herself. In order to
resist the pressure coming from an increasing number of non-EU countries (and,
of course, in order to 'legalize' the new European 'standard' of liberal democracy),
                                                          
37 Schimmelfennig, Frank. International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an
Institutional Environment. European Journal of International Relations. Vol 6, No. 1, March 2000.
109-139. pp 111.
38 Schimmelfennig, Frank. International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an
Institutional Environment. European Journal of International Relations. Vol 6, No. 1, March 2000.
109-139. pp 110.
41
the European Council issued at its 1993 Copenhagen Summit a decision which
was to tell which countries can become members of the European Union, and
hence, of 'Europe', and which can not39.
The so-called "Copenhagen-criteria" for European Union membership read as
follows:
• The applicant country must have achieved stability of institutions, guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of,
minorities;
• It must have a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
• It must have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. It must take on
board the EU body of law, known as the acquis communautaire.40
These criteria are exclusively of political, economic and legal nature. Hence, the
"normative foundation" of the 'new Europe' seems to eclipse any other possible
foundation - cultural, historical, religious, and so forth. The Copenhagen-criteria
for EU-membership do not – and, for understandable reasons, cannot – talk, for
instance,  about the internalization of the 'norms and values', the 'principles' and
'aims' of the European Union. Therefore, the legitimate question arises whether an
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economic identity ("We are rich, the others are poor") or a political one ("We are
good and just, the others are bad and unjust") can make up for the lack of a
common identity at the cultural, religious, linguistic, etc, levels.
It was Robert Schuman, the founding father of the European Community of Coal
and Steel, the predecessor of the European Union, who in 1963 emphatically
wrote: "Before becoming a military alliance or an economic entity, Europe has to
be a cultural community in the highest sense of the word."41 Well, ever since,
Europe acquired a strong economic identity, and a relatively European (and today,
increasingly European) military identity, but the 'cultural community in the
highest sense of the word' Schuman was talking about could not ever since be
materialized. Moreover, the 'pooling of sovereignty', this new term in international
relations which was meant to save Realist theories from being dismissed entirely
for their not being able to explain why countries give up some of their sovereignty
today, does not seem to work properly either. Schuman's Europe failed, not only
because it did not create an all-European cultural identity, but also because the
political 'aims' of the European Union are incompatible with the preservation of
national sovereignties in policies such as the ones regarding immigration, culture,
taxation and so forth.
Culture does not seem to matter in the 'new Europe' at all. The reality suggests
quite the opposite. The recent decision of the British, French and German
governments to close down their cultural institutes in each other's countries seems
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to confirm that the 'pooling of national cultures' is not envisaged by the leading
countries of Europe. The British Council will close four of its five representations
in Germany in the year 2001. France will close this year 12 of her 24 Instituts
Francais in Germany. The Goethe Institute plans to close down its representations
in Manchester, Gothenburg, Lille and Colmar, while opening new ones in some
remote, more exotic places such as Havana, Algiers, Teheran or Shanghai.
Bearing in mind that the main activity of these cultural institutes is the teaching of
language, it is an irony that all these closures are going to happen in the
"European Year of Languages", as the year 2001 has been baptized by the
European Commission42.
Such developments are not "bad" in itself. That is, it is not necessary for the
various cultures and languages to "integrate" in order to further the creation of a
political-economic human collective called 'Europe' or European Union. Indeed,
"Britain and France were culturally closer [than today] in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, when they were not merely politically divergent but often
actually at war."43 What is rather deplorable today is that cultural links become
weaker and are perceived as 'burdens' in spite of the "ever closer Union", thus
leading to the rise of the legitimate question whether it is not exactly this trend
towards an ever closer political and economic union of culturally very different
states which has negative effects upon cultural co-operation in Europe? If the
answer is yes, then the further opening of this sort of scissors can easily be a
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reason for future conflicts or even wars, in spite of the economic or military
interdependence created by the European Union.
The times of a religious Europe also seem to have ended long ago. Today we see
the emergence of a Europe of various religions and sects, which divide Europeans
rather than uniting them. The largest church, the Roman Catholic Church, is more
divided in Europe than ever before (while converting hundreds of thousands in
Southeast Asia and Africa). Only a little bit more than a hundred years after the
'rebellion' of Carl Joseph von Hefele, the Catholic Bishop of Rottenburg, against
the infallibility of the Vatican, another German Bishop, Franz Kamphaus, Bishop
of Limburg, challenges the Pope and his 'Universal' empire. The conflict is getting
out of control and the split between Kamphaus's numerous followers (among
whom are several German bishops) and the Vatican is imminent44. John Paul II
did more for his church's image towards the outside world than for its own
cohesion: while visiting and preaching in 123 countries during his 22 years in
office, which is without doubt a record among popes, the stubbornness with which
domestic 'politics' are conducted by him in matters such as abortion, birth control
or divorce will most probably lead to other protests within the Catholic Church in
Europe, and hence, to the loss of Catholic souls to other confessions45. The new
Europe will host a large number of converted Neo-Protestants, Buddhists or
Muslims, while the 'traditional' churches of Europe, the Catholic and Protestant
churches, will lose an increasing number of their adepts: the Protestant churches
because they are not 'protestant' enough, and the Catholic Church because of its
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inability to adapt to the realities created by the rapid processes of technological
development and modernization in general.
The 'shared history' of Europeans which is supposed to bring Europeans closer to
each other is also only myth. In reality, the history of Europe was a history of
divisions, not one of unity. The Germans seem to have forgotten that before 1871
they themselves lived in maybe more states than the rest of Europe altogether. The
Italians, the French, the Spaniards or the "Belgians" live today in states in which
centrifugal forces are still challenging the mythical unity created by the callings of
Italy, France, Spain or Belgium.
However, the most prominent among the divisions within Europe is the division
into a 'rich' and civilized West, and a 'poor' and barbaric ("post-communist") East,
along what used to be called the 'Iron Curtain' (according to many, the
reunification of Germany did not yet lead to the full integration of the former
GDR into 'the West' – hence my assertion that the Elbe, or, the old Iron Curtain-
line, and not the new "Oder-line", is the main division line in Europe). The past
fifty-some years of European history did alienate peoples from the East and West
of Europe so much from each other, that this division of the continent will
probably last the longest, at least for the next few decades to come.
Hence, if it is neither culture, nor religion, nor history, then it seems as if today
the concept of 'Europe' means not much more than what the Copenhagen criteria
set forth as conditions for EU-membership. And indeed, "Europe is today a
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synonym of the European Union", one author says straightforwardly.46 And, the
European Union is, above all,  an economic union. Nothing more.
2.3. The standard in the new Europe: double standards
The European Union, and thus, 'Europe', is the most institutionalized region of the
international system. Everything, starting from the ingredients of toothpaste and
ending at the size of contraceptives, is standardized. Over twenty thousand
bureaucrats with tax-free salaries meet daily in several hundred standing
committees in the EU-hydrocephalus called Brussels in order to negotiate this or
that regulation, to be proposed by the Commission to the Parliament. However,
many of these regulations are passed by the Parliament without being later strictly
observed and enforced by the executive authorities, which are in most of the cases
the national governments. The reasons for this are legion, but one of them is
particularly important: the bureaucratic style, as imposed by the decision makers
in Brussels, is "unfamiliar to", and ignores "the deepest civic traditions and habits,
the cultural psychology" of, the various states.47 Whereas in Britain, for instance,
an EU-regulation would be put into domestic law and be enforced unequivocally
by the state authorities, this might not be always the case in, for instance, France,
not to speak of Italy or Greece, and even less in the potential EU-members called
Romania or Bulgaria. Hence, it is understandable, that more and more Europe-
experts talk about the possibility of a "two-speed-", or, "several-speed-Europe".
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The IGC ended by the European Council of Nice introduced the principle of
majority voting instead of the practice of unanimous voting in a large number of
fields and issues. Theoretically at least, from now on, those countries which do
not want to participate in this or that policy or action, are exempted from it
without, however, stopping other member countries from pursuing it. What this,
together with the aforementioned imposition of 'alien' legal practices, is leading
to, I do not hesitate to call 'the European standard of double-standards'. In this
section I will point at some of these double-standards by giving relevant examples
to how harmful standards in general, and double-standards in particular, can be to
the creation of an "ever-closer Union".
2.3.1. Democracy and democratic deficits
Exactly fifty years ago, in April 1951, the leaders of six Western European
countries signed in Paris the so-called Schuman-plan, which was to mean the
beginning of a new Europe, with no wars and lots of democracy. Schuman's
Europe was built in contrast to, or, if we were to believe Henri Spaak, in reply to
the monster created in "the other Europe" by Stalin and the Soviet Union. Ever
since, sovereign Western European states give up increasing bits of their
sovereignty and "pool it" in Brussels, for peace and more democracy, it is said.
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However, with the Maastricht Treaty and more recently, with the creation of a
European currency called with not too much ingenuity "Euro", the European
Union became herself uncontrollable. Today, the European Union is excessively
centralized and overbureaucratized, which taken together are the sufficient
conditions for inefficiency – although it is exactly in the name of more efficiency
that such centralization is taking place. For instance, the number of quality
standards for products which are sold on the European market increases annually
by almost one thousand and is expected to reach by the end of the year 2001 the
fabulous number of 12.500.48 These standards have to be adopted by all the
member (and future member) states, their English texts translated into the fourteen
official languages of the EU (and in addition to this, into the languages of the 12
candidate countries). Then these texts are printed and distributed to the enforcing
national bodies. By the time the text in question reaches the producers who have
to design their products in accordance with these standards, the EU will have most
probably amended the standard due to the protests coming from this or that
pressure group, and, the original description of the standard will become unusable.
(Un)fortunately, this is not always the case: the straight European cucumber, as it
has been standardized by the cucumber-experts in Brussels will most probably
stay straight, to the great disappointment of the European cucumber-lobby –
because, after all, any crooked cucumber is no longer a cucumber, just as the
straight bananas which are not an Afro-Caribbean product are not bananas in
Europe49.
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Today we talk about Brussels as if it were the capital of a federal state called the
European Union. But the European Union is not a federal state, and as of yet it is
not intended to become one. And still, the Commission in Brussels accumulated
so much power over the territory of the Union as if it were the government of
Europe. "Indeed, 'Europe' now has or claims larger powers over its members in
some fields (such as labor law) than the federal government in Washington has
over the states."50 And this happens without a popular mandate since the members
of the main decision making bodies of the European Union, namely the European
Council and the European Commission, are neither elected, nor checked, nor
accountable.
The Maastricht Treaty, and more recently, the European Council of Nice,
addressed some of these questions of accountability and legitimacy of the bodies
of the European Union. Also, the trend towards uniformization (usually at the
lowest common denominator level) in Europe seems to give way to a more
"democratic" practice: states which do not intend to participate in this or that
policy, can abstain from doing so without barring other states from pursuing it.
This is made possible by the introduction of the practice of majority voting which
replaces the hitherto practiced vote by consensus.
It is obvious that such changes towards qualified majority voting systems had to
be introduced sooner or later in the enlargement process, if the European Union
did not want to become famous for its own being undemocratic. But it is equally
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true that this can easily lead to different levels of membership within the
European Union, according to the standards which this or that country is willing
to adopt. The negative vote of the Danes in the Euro-issue (and the likely "no"-
vote of the British, should a referendum be held on the issue) showed, that some
nations do not want to continue taking the path dictated by Brussels.
53.1 % of the Danes voted against the Euro, an outcome which led to frustration
in most capitals of Europe51. But it is usual in the European Union that policies
get a support or a rejection somewhere close to the 50%-hurdle. A British scholar
grasped what many Europeans do not (want to) see: major changes of policy in
the European Union are carried out "on the basis of the most meager temporary
majorities, as with the French near rejection of Maastricht, or Welsh near rejection
of devolution. Worse still, the referenda are repeated (as in Denmark) until the
desired result is obtained – then represented as irreversible!"52 In other words, it is
usually around half of the total of Europeans voters (and previous experience
shows clearly that it is usually the "yes"-party, mobilized by the national
governments, which goes to the polls), or even less, who support their respective
government's adhesion to this or that European Union policy.
According to a recent poll, two thirds of the Germans want to leave the Euro53,
now that it is pulling their good old Deutsche Mark downwards – however, this
will prove much more difficult. Whereas the EU created the mechanisms for not
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joining a policy, it did not (why not?) solve the question of how a country can
retreat from a policy which it adopted earlier. Hence, it is highly possible that in
the near future we will witness an Inter-Governmental Conference or a European
Council dealing with the issue of how an EU-member state can withdraw its
initial support for an EU- policy, and thus, step back into a 'lower-level'
membership.
The tendency is without doubt, that the policymakers in Brussels try to respond to
accusations of leading an increasingly undemocratic European Union by making it
more democratic through adequate reforms. Bearing in mind that the European
Union continues both its own "deepening" and the enlargement process, or, in
other words, that the strain on European institutions will constantly increase in the
near future, it is questionable whether the European Union will be able to stay
what it initially intended to be: a genuine Union of European states, rather than
becoming an organization of states which are not united but divided by several
levels of membership.
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2.3.2. Democracy, totalitarianism and the protection of human rights
"We have to insist on the fact that Fascism and Communism are not alien to
Europe. We should continue to explain how these totalitarian systems are
interlinked with our culture. Not only because these ideologies emerged on our
continent, but also because they are products of European culture."54
It is not by coincidence that Bronislav Geremek warns Europeans against
forgetting their recent past. The democratic heaven called 'Europe' is becoming
increasingly undemocratic. But whereas institutions or voting systems can be
changed or "reformed", and thus made "more democratic" (as it happened very
recently in Nice), everyday attitudes of people seem to be deeply rooted and
difficult to influence through the means of democracy.
Extremism in its various forms did not disappear in Europe, neither after the
Second World War, nor after 1989. Today we witness a sort of a rebirth of the
political extreme Right, at least in its rhetoric. "Wetzt die langen Messer auf dem
Buergersteig/ Lasst die Messer flutschen in den Judenleib" – slogans like this are
not a taboo in the Germany of the year 200055. The Neo-Nazi "Nationale Partei
Deutschlands" (NPD), which is represented in numerous German city councils,
seems to be the rather successful in co-opting the politically passive German
youth. Although the 'braune Szene' of Germany counts no more than
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approximately 50.000 members, the membership is becoming increasingly radical
while rapidly expanding. Many local councils in Germany are already dominated
by the extreme right. The city council of Zittau, a small town in the former GDR,
supports the 'Nationale Jugendblock' with an impressive local headquarters and
even with money. The members of the 'Odins Legion' in Kittlitz-Glossen, another
small town in Saxony, organize their regular meetings in a 'Jugendclub' sponsored
by the city, in addition to which a substantial amount of money is donated by
anonymous private donors. In the county of Saechsische Schweiz only, no less
then fifty-four so-called 'Jugendclubs' hide larger neo-Nazi organizations, all
backed by the NPD56.
Sympathies for the extreme Right or Nazism are nurtured not only by some
Germans, but by members of other great European nations as well. A recently
published book on Le voyage d'automne57, a secret travel through the Third Reich
organized for a group of French intellectuals by Hitler in 1941, awakened entire
France to a less attractive reality: the long forgotten, if not hidden, readiness of a
large number of French writers, poets, artists and other prominent intellectuals to
collaborate with Hitler re-opened the debate on how antifascist the French of
today might be58. Jean-Marie Le Pen, while getting more and more criticisms
from the older public, is becoming increasingly known to the younger
generations. The last elections in France, where his Front National received 14,9
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percent of the votes, shows that the sympathy for 'law and order', as they are
understood by Le Pen, is increasing59.
The list of organized extreme Rightist or totalitarian movements could continue
and it is not limited to Germany and France only. Skinheads in the Czech
Republic, Slovakia or Hungary declared an organized war on Gypsies, and the
state authorities are mere spectators to, if not even active supporters of, this. The
authorities of Usti nad Labem in the Czech Republic built a wall around the
Gypsy neighborhood of the small town, an action supported by the majority of the
population60. Marshall Antonescu has been rehabilitated and is currently
celebrated in Romania as a national hero for his anti-Soviet foreign policy,
although he is internationally held responsible for the killing of 410.000 Jews and
other war crimes committed as Adolf Hitler's closest ally in the Balkans61. The
far-Right Partidul Romania Mare received at the last general elections (held in
2000) almost twenty percent of the votes in Romania, and almost fifty percent in
the multi-ethnic province of Transylvania, although (or maybe exactly because)
its leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, has declared several times during the election
campaign that he would dissolve the Romanian parliament as soon as he would be
elected president and introduce the "dictatorship of law".
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Let us not, however, confuse the dangerous extreme-Right, the bearers of
totalitarian reflexes with the less harmful "far-Right" which sometimes adopts an
extreme-Rightist rhetoric or attitude. It is not the emergence of figures such as
Jorg Haider or Silvio Berlusconi that threatens democracy in Europe. It is rather
they who seem to, at least thus far, keep the political Right under control.
However, a radicalization of their parties may become inevitable if Haider and
Berlusconi lose control over their electorate. This can easily happen through
personal changes in the leadership of their parties, or, through a further increase in
their parties' popularity – the latter possibility would unavoidably lead to an
increase in the 'self-confidence' of these parties and hence to a claim to a bigger
share in the work of the national governments.
On the other extreme of the political spectrum, the extreme left in Western Europe
has been smashed completely by the implosion of the communist regimes in
Eastern Europe. The recent scandals provoked in Germany by Joschka Fischer's
past activity in the Rote Armee Fraktion, a leftist-terrorist organization which
horrified Germany and Western Europe in the seventies and eighties through
bomb attacks and hijackings, seems to discredit the radical Leftist movements
even more. Little 'pockets' of communists can still be found in Greece, northern
Italy, France, and in most of the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe.
However, the radical political Left seems to lose its footing all across Europe at
the beginning of the 21st century.
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The paradox of European democracy is that it tolerates (and sometimes protects)
extremism. The long series of treaties and agreements adopted within the
framework of the European Union, and, most importantly, the Council of Europe,
cannot protect the Jews, the Gypsies or other minorities from being harassed or
persecuted. Most of these legal texts allow lots of space for interpretation through
inexact language or clauses which stipulate that, for instance, a minority is what
the Constitution of the respective country considers to be one. Therefore, the
adoption of a European Constitution, scheduled for the year 2004, seems to be a
solution to this problem. If this Constitution will be a legally binding document
which overwrites national laws and constitutions, there is a chance to eradicate
most of the political extremisms in the European Union through the means of
democracy, namely by law, just as is done by the Constitution of the United States
of America. If, however (and this is more likely to be the case), the European
Constitution is just another pan-European, pompously announced 'treaty', signed
by some, ratified by others, and enforced by only a very few, extremist and
totalitarian movements or parties will become a part of our everyday life: they
will sooner or later enter Europe's national parliaments or the European
Parliament and threaten the increasingly constipated European democracies.
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2.3.3. Crime, corruption and the rule of law
Corruption at the state level is a discussion subject whenever an EU-envoy visits
Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria, as if corruption in these countries were endemic.
Whereas corruption is indeed a widespread phenomenon in Central and Eastern
Europe (this is mainly due to the heritage of four and a half decades of
communism), and needs not be presented here, let us wonder a little about how
corruption at the highest levels affects the societies in the West of Europe.
Recently, German news agencies reported that the Christian Democratic Union
received "gifts" of several million German Marks from German businesses during
the past years. This money was destined to, and partly spent on, the last general
elections held in Germany. First, the scandal outraged public opinion, and led to
the dramatic fall of the CDU-s popularity in most of Germany. A several months
long investigation followed, during which new evidence for corruption at the top
level, including ex-chancellor Helmut Kohl, was presented to the public.
However, after a year or so of investigations, the German public seems to get used
to such maneuvers, and starts accepting the idea that politicians are corrupt. Just
like that. And since talking about state corruption in Germany became "normal",
the Spiegel editors recently published an article on France with the title: "Dieses
Regime ist korrupt", this time accusing French top politicians of illegal party-
sponsoring and other crimes which come under the heading of 'corruption'62. This
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would have been unthinkable in Adenauer's and De Gaulle's times. However,
today it seems as if the entire political elite of France is corrupt. Recently, The
Economist established 'the latest hit-list' of top-politicians who are either accused
of, or investigated for, corruption in France. To the big surprise and astonishment
of the reader the list includes a president, one former prime minister, three former
finance ministers, two governors of the Banque de France and many others63.
Although other corruption scandals like the ones in Italy, Belgium and Spain
shook Europe in the past few years, the scandal of the biggest magnitude was
provoked by the European Commission in Brussels, when, in 1998-1999 it was
revealed that nepotism and corruption have penetrated the Commission to such a
degree that the resignation of the entire Commission (composed of twenty-one
appointed Commissioners) became imminent. As it turned out, "in 1995 [only],
some $10 billion had disappeared through fraud or incompetence – plus a fair
percentage through 'error'" from the EU's $ 90 billion budget64.
Many cases of corruption or fraud in the EU will never be punished due to the
extremely sophisticated EU-regulations which make a clear overview of financial
matters impossible. A few years ago, newspapers reported on 'intransparent'
tenders for the construction of the new headquarters of the European Commission
and the European Parliament (when it does not meet in Strasbourg), a huge glass-
palace to be built in Brussels. Companies owned by EU-officials had been
commissioned to participate in the construction and furnishing of the building,
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and, as it turned out, many of the bills were suspiciously high, sometimes up to
ten times higher than could have been justified. Nobody has been, so far,
punished. Another issue which still encourages both state-officials and private
entrepreneurs to commit different crimes which enter under the calling of 'fraud' is
the Common Agricultural Policy which costs more than half of the EU-budget.
This money is paid to producers of agricultural goods as subsidies – money which
simply goes and never returns (and in addition to this, it undermines free
competition, and hence, efficiency, on the European market of agricultural
products).
What is the relevance of all these cases of corruption or fraud for this thesis? They
all support my idea that the times of a Europe in which people and their leaders
respected each other, the times in which laws were obeyed and enforced in
(continental) Europe, are over. Europe is becoming an increasingly 'rotten' place
as far as morality and ethics are concerned. The by far too many laws, regulations,
decisions and other legal documents make Europeans lose their respect for the
Law and become less scrupulous about breaching it. In a sense, the 'unification' of
Europe leads to a sense of distrust and disobedience among Europeans while
another single market is being created: "a single market in crime".65
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 2.4. Exclusion through enlargement: the integration/exclusion nexus
According to Article 0 of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the European Union),
every European state which so wishes may apply for membership of the Union.
This, however, complicates matters because a clear (geographic) definition of
Europe is not given. The future inclusion into the EU of the Visegrad countries or
of the Baltic states poses no problem in this context, but are Turkey, Cyprus,
Malta, Iceland or Morocco, European?
If we lived two centuries ago, the most important criterion for EU-membership
would have been without doubt Christianity. Neither Turkey, nor Morocco could
have applied for membership. If only Western Christian countries were allowed to
join the European Union, neither these predominantly Muslim countries, nor
Greece or any other Orthodox country could become a member. If having
belonged to the Roman Empire is the criterion, neither the Baltic states, nor many
other European and Scandinavian countries could become EU-members. And
finally, "if the criterion is economic performance, even the application of the
Visegrad countries and Baltic states may become unacceptable, not to mention
Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Bosnia, the Federation of Yugoslavia, Albania,
Ukraine, Belarus, and so on. In this case, data on growth, public deficits, interest
rates, privatization and other fiscal matters will be much more relevant than
discussions about common cultural interests or differences"66.
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The handling of 'Europeanness' in the expansion practice of the European Union
reveals at least three patterns. One is, as we have seen in the case of Morocco in
1986, clear and unequivocal. Morocco is not a European country and that was
that. The history we could spin about Morocco's Europeanness based on a sort of
a common Moroccan-European history does not help Morocco in becoming
'European'67.
The second pattern is the most often encountered one: the various candidate
countries are promised membership at an unknown future date, with the condition
to fulfill the various criteria for membership.
The third pattern, which is at the other extreme, is about how the EU handled the
"accession" of the former GDR. In this case there was no application, no
referendum, not even a ratification by the European Community states. The GDR
entered the EC/EU through a unique backdoor. First, the two Germanys have been
'reunified'. Then, when Eastern Germans became bearers of the same green
passport as their fellow brothers in the West, they automatically became citizens
of the already existing Federal Republic, and thus, of the European Communities
as well. Finally, the formality which was to end the GDR's "accession" to the EC
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both the European Union and the Maghreb and Mashraq countries
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was the 'enlargement' of the European Council and the readjustment of Germany's
votes in the Council to the new realities.68
The first and the latter pattern in the EU's enlargement practice is based on some
simple assumptions – 1. Morocco is not in Europe; 2. if the largest part of the
Germans are European enough to be members of the EC, than the remaining part
of the Germans must be granted EC-citizenship as well, notwithstanding the fact
that they had been probably by far more "communist" than some of their former
allies, such as the Hungarians or the Polish. However, what interests us here is
how the enlargement process might continue, and what issues will become
important in this process of 'Europeanization' of other European (and non-
European) countries.
Although I asserted earlier that the European Union is a rather political-economic
organization, culture and religion seems to play an important role in the EU-s
enlargement practice. Today it looks as if only the Visegrad-countries, Slovenia,
Malta and the Baltic states will join the European Union within the foreseeable
future, in spite of assurances from Brussels that Romania and Bulgaria (the only
predominantly Orthodox candidate-countries on the continent), and Cyprus and
Turkey have the same chances for membership, provided they fulfill the
aforementioned Copenhagen criteria for EU-accession.
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Such division among the candidate countries has obvious reasons. Whereas the
first group of states belongs to the Western Christian, Catholic-Protestant world,
the rest of the candidate countries is either largely Orthodox or Muslim. If one
assumes that the current members of the EU (and their citizens, except the
Greeks) want Europe to stay a Western-Christian community – and opinion polls
show that the latter four countries' accession has the lowest backing within the
EU's population69 – then one should ask the legitimate question why these
countries have been included into the list of candidate countries for EU-
membership at all.
The first two countries, Bulgaria and Romania have been granted EU-association
status through the so-called "Europe-Agreements" (Partnership Agreements)
signed in 1994. At that time, the Yugoslav wars of dissolution turned into inter-
ethnic slaughter which threatened to expand beyond the borders of the old
Yugoslav Socialist Federal Republic. In Romania, the coalition of Ion Iliescu's
center-Left party with both the extreme Left and the extreme Right was seen as a
danger to the escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts, focused mainly in the province
of Transylvania. In addition to this, Romanian sympathies towards Serbia,
materialized in the permanent breach of the embargo against Yugoslavia, could be
much easier held under control when the EU showed a bit of 'understanding' for
Romania's losses from trade with Yugoslavia (and some million ECU in grants),
and eventually, promised Romania future EU-membership. Besides defusing
popular unrest, this gesture was also meant to weaken Ion Iliescu's position and
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strengthen the chances of the Democratic Convention for winning the elections to
be held in 1996.
Tensions already existing due to the new independence of Macedonia - whose
name raised vehement Greek objections and whose language is only slightly
different from Bulgarian -, led to the more than obvious decision of EU-policy
makers to grant EU-Partnership to Bulgaria, too, the country having plunged
somewhat earlier into a deep economic and political crisis, and hence, being
vulnerable to the expansion of the Yugoslav wars. Also, EU-partnership was an
important stimulus (and a necessary condition) for Bulgaria and Romania to
become members of the Central-European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), an
organization which had as its ultimate goal to speed-up the EU-integration of its
members.
However, once the Dayton Agreement was signed, and the accession talks with
the other Eastern European candidates speeded up, Bulgaria and Romania started
being treated with more sticks than carrots by the EU. Entry visa requirements,
which became unnecessary towards other Eastern European countries right after
1991, have still not been lifted entirely, and attention in general towards these two
countries has been considerably reduced by the EU after the end of the Yugoslav
wars. The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, sponsored by the EU after the
NATO-bombings of 1999, is focused on countries in the Western Balkans, rather
than on Bulgaria and Romania. Hence, I deduce, the acceptance of the Bulgarian
and Romanian candidacy by the EU was motivated by reasons of contingency, or,
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in the best case of opportunism, rather then by any serious wish to see these
countries become full members of the European Union. The accession talks
started with these two countries in March 2000 are today in a relatively initial
stage and their speed does not indicate that membership is possible or wanted in
the near future
The Cypriot application was granted consideration, and accession talks started in
1997, due to Greece's pressures to do so. This happened notwithstanding the fact
that from the point of view of international law Cyprus is not allowed to join any
international organization without the agreement of Greece, Turkey and Great
Britain. The small island with rather weird financial and fiscal policies (Cyprus is
notorious for attracting European and non-European businesses evading fiscal
duties at home through its low income-tax policy) is anything else but desired in
the EU, although the inclusion of Cyprus would bring back home large amounts
of 'escaped' capital. Also, it was hoped that the question of the divided island far
in the East of the Mediterranean can be solved through EU-membership of the
whole island. However, there is no indication that the EU can handle the matter
without the future inclusion of Turkey into the Union.
As far as Turkey is concerned, the matters are getting somewhat more
complicated. Turkey's EC/EU-partnership dates back to the times of the Cold War
and therefore some reassuring steps towards the largest potential EU-member (and
second largest in terms of population) had to be taken. There are, however, many
other reasons for Turkey's ('promised') EU-integration as well. Firstly, Turkey is
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still regarded as the most reliable military ally of Europe in the Eastern
Mediterranean region. Secondly, it was hoped that the intra-EU relations with the
most problematic EU member of the nineties (Greece) can be improved if Turkey
(and Cyprus) becomes an EU-member. Thirdly, bearing in mind Turkey's
economic potential (in spite of the actual crisis), its demographic boom and not
less importantly, its strategic position in the middle of economic transit routes
from North to South and from East to West, it was obvious that a Turkey kept
closer to the Union, rather than left as a "prey" to others (or, to herself) benefits
the EU much more than would harm it. However, Turkey's accession to the EU (in
spite of the recently accepted candidacy) is not likely within the foreseeable
future. No national referendum in the EU or very few national parliaments would
sanction Turkey's EU-accession within at least the next one decade to come.
2.5. Two sources of disunity in Europe: language and history
"The European Union looks like a nation: it has a flag, a national anthem, a
common passport, even a citizenship. But it does not have the inner organs:
democracy, accountability, or even any basic constitutional principles."70 Not yet ,
the well informed European would say: at the European Council of Nice it has
been decided that a European Constitution will be 'passed' by the European Union
by the year 2004. This, of course, only if the Nice-resolutions will be by then
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ratified by the national parliaments71.  The lacking "inner organs" of the European
Union are many, and many of them have already been discussed in this paper.
Here I wish to talk only about two of them, language and history, and about their
implications for European unity and disunity.
What makes the 'ever closer union' "sound" rather weird is that the fifteen nations
which are creating it speak no less than twelve different languages (if one does not
count the languages of their respective minorities or the various dialects as well).
Moreover, all these languages are, theoretically at least, official languages of the
European Union. Should the Union be enlarged in the future, any official
language of a new member-nation will automatically become an official language
of the European Union as well. If one considers that it is the declared goal of the
European Union to maintain and support the linguistic and cultural autonomy of
Europe's nations and ethnic minorities, any sort of planning in Europe requires
that we recognize that this cultural diversity is here to stay, and, sooner or later, to
increase.
In practice, however, English and French dominate over all the other languages in
the European Union. It is especially the English language which became the
common language in international economics, politics or education. German,
Italian and Spanish are also used in daily business, but to a much lesser degree.
This can, however, change in the near future. Today there are more German
speakers than speakers of any other language in Europe. Therefore, for example, it
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would make sense to declare German as a third official language of the Council of
Europe72. Spanish or Italian are also increasingly popular among people who learn
languages. Spanish has in addition to this the great advantage of being widely
spoken in Latin-America.
The big 'loser' in the new Europe seems to be French. Whereas the dominant
position of English as the language of business in the world cannot anymore be
questioned, the emergence of German as the first foreign language spoken by
most Central Europeans weakens the position of French. Also, "the growing
influence of English strengthens the German position, for the French are
reportedly inclined to side with the German in order to prevent the dominance of
their main competitor.73"
What are the implications of linguistics for the 'ever closer union'? The answer is:
many. The lack of a common language, or, at least of a language spoken by all
Europeans besides their own mother tongues, has serious effects on the mobility
of labor force or capital investment, it undercuts the efficiency of free trade, and
most importantly, it costs, according to some reports, up to 40 % of the EU's
budget through the (un)necessary translation of every single official EU-document
into twenty-odd European languages.
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Guest workers remain strangers after retirement in the state in which they reside
for the simple reason that they do not speak the language of their environment.
This, as we can observe nowadays, leads to serious social problems in net labor-
importing countries like Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy,
Britain and so forth. Hence, Europe is soon becoming a mosaic of cultural
minorities living abroad.
Also, the lack of knowledge of the language of regions in need of labor force will
keep potential guest workers from going there to work in the future. The region in
question will continue being in need of workers, while the region in which the
potential guest worker originates might encounter continued social distress arising
from high rates of unemployment. If, however, there were a European lingua
franca, labor mobility would most probably increase and thus lead to a more
efficient division of labor among regions. Everybody would profit from this,
including the guest-worker himself, the region to which he moves, his new
employer and his native region. The lack of a common European language is
therefore a handicap for Europe which causes, from the economic and social point
of view, lots of problems and no advantages at all.
The philosopher Juergen Habermas suggested at the beginning of the nineties a
"two level approach" to this matter: there should be, next to the native language of
all Europeans, a second language which is spoken by all Europeans74. Say, all
Europeans should become at least bilingual. The obvious candidate for such a
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European language is at present English. From South-Korea to Turkey and from
France to Russia, most of the European and extra-European economic powers
adopted English as the language of business and international communication in
general. However, a long time will pass before we see English, or any other
European language, become spoken by all Europeans as a second mother tongue
(of course, if this will ever happen). Until then, the construction of Europe will be
continuously disturbed by a cacophony of official languages, comparable with the
one experienced by the builders of the biblical tower of Babel. The many official
languages in the European Union will continue dividing Europeans as their
leaders try to convince them that multilinguism and multiculturalism make Europe
a more tolerant and united space. What a delusion!
The myth of a shared history does not hold the European nations together either.
Those who say that the young generations are immune to WWII- or Cold-War-
time conflicts among nations, are wrong. The almost five decades long Cold War
left a rather sad legacy on Europe. Whereas this has its rather obvious reasons
(Eastern European countries are economically backward if compared with the rest
of Europe, migration towards Western Europe causes lots of social strain in
Western-European societies, and so forth), it is striking that even within the
unified Germany old ideological animosity turned today into intra-German
discrimination based on geographical origin: the once-upon-a-time friendly terms
'Wessie' and 'Ossie' are today used by the young as negative stigmas on both sides
of the river Elbe.
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Although there is little reliable and useful research-based information about young
people's attitude towards 'Europe' and 'Europeanisation'75, recent Eurobarometer
polls show that young Europeans are at least as much trapped by history as the
older generations. According to one study based on both personal research and
Eurobarometer polls, the Dutch youth has a strongly negative attitude towards
Germans, although, when asked about the reasons for this, the interviewed could
point only at the dominantly negative attitude of the older generations towards
Germany and the Germans in general76.
The many negative stereotypes about the Germans (Germans drink beer, are fat,
are noisy, have huge Mercedes cars etc.) are all rooted in the dark history of the
twentieth century. This is supported by the findings that, as soon as Dutch youth
gets in personal contact with Germans, these stereotypes seem to disappear,
giving way to more positive ones, this time based on personal experience:
Germans are nice and hospitable. However, attitudes towards Germany and the
Germans in general are rather hostile all across Europe. The French, the Polish,
the Czech, the 'Belgians' – all those who had to suffer from Nazi occupation
during the war-, cannot, or do not want to, 'forget' the past. This is true, and it is
sometimes even more true, of the generations which did not experience the
Second World War. To be sure, the past is not the only reason for this: the
neighbors of Germany, especially the smaller nations or the relatively poorer
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Polish nation, do not want to be "swallowed" by Germany, the economically
strongest country in Europe.
"It is quite obvious [today] that the images of neighboring countries are influenced
by the specific history those countries do or do not share. That history existed
long before the emergence of the European Community and affects current
stereotypes of the inhabitants of the respective countries"77. Hence, the history of
the 'dark continent'78 has to be rewritten if the European project of an ever closer
union is to succeed. Only then, when collective national guilt will become an
obsolete concept, replaced by the responsibility of the individual(s) who
committed this or that "historical injustice", will 'Europe' work.
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CONCLUSION
After such lengthy elaboration on some selected topics in current European
politics, without, however, claiming that I have touched upon all the possible
political, economic, historical, cultural, religious, linguistic and so forth, aspects
of  'the new Europe', I can conclude the following:
- the discipline of international relations is lacking a sound historical approach to
contemporary European politics inasmuch as it relies on the past realities of a
'more predictable' bipolar world in which state behavior was dictated by two
competing ideologies and their sub-branches. In today's so-called multipolar
world, in which state actors have a by far broader choice in their foreign policies,
and hence, international political actions are much 'less predictable', a deeper
knowledge of the world, and particularly, of its history, is necessary in order to
understand the outcomes of political processes. Under no circumstances can any
one political theory explain or predict state behavior today with accuracy.
- the fact that the study of theories (rather than the study of the processes on which
these theories are relying), is dominating the practice of the discipline of
international relations obscures the fact that the relations among states and
societies are carried out by humans whose rational behavior cannot be dictated by
this or that theory. Rational state behavior is therefore only as rational (and
predictable) as the humans which constitute it are rational (and hence, predictable)
in their choices.
- not only history (political, economic, cultural, intellectual, etc.), but the findings
of other fields of the social sciences are also very helpful in exploring the relations
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among states. The study of anthropology, sociology, psychology, linguistics,
literature, national mythology, etc., are increasingly relevant to the study of
international relations.
- although (or, maybe because) Europe is the most institutionalized region of the
international system, the norms created by any European institution are
impossible to enforce without punishment. This raises the question of whether the
legitimacy of such institutions is based on delegation or abdication, on democratic
choice or coerced agreement. The steady decline of the number of those who cast
their vote at national and European elections indicates that around half of the
European Union's citizens are not represented by the European Union's
institutions.
- it is debatable whether such institutionalization of every walk of life without the
backing of a strong supranational decision making body is more viable than the
practice of the "firm leadership, light rule"-principle. In my opinion, for the
reasons enumerated in this paper, it is not. Moreover, as long as increasing
regulation will continue to be seen as a substitute for a firm leadership, the path
chosen by the leaders of the European Union will have to end in a deadlock. Only
deregulation and a firm all-European leadership (possibly meaning a European
Federation) backed by the majority vote of Europe's citizens can avoid the
European Union's becoming caught in the net spun by its stubborn leadership.
- there are two forces acting upon Europe today. The first is aimed at 'unifying'
Europe through the uniformization of the various standards of the European
nations. From consumer products to legal procedures and from the various
educational systems to identities and languages, the environment in which most of
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Europe's citizens live tends to become increasingly standardized as a result of
these policies. The second force aims at obstructing this process, if not reversing
it, by emphasizing the usefulness of the national framework in providing
efficiency, development in general, and prosperity. At present, the first process is
dominant, which, however, does not mean that it is irreversible. Indeed, if one
looks back into the past two hundred years of European history he may find that
unity and disunity were characteristic features of Europe in the various historical
periods.
- the two forces behind unification and segregation seem to reinforce each other
today. It is impossible to predict whether this may lead to a. the temporary
"defeat" of one force by the other through peaceful means or b. to intra-European
war.
- many of the political criteria of 'Europeanness', as they are formulated through the
"Copenhagen-criteria" for accession to the European Union, are not observed
within the European Union today.
- the bigger international institutions grow, the less efficient they become. This loss
of efficiency can be reduced (but under no circumstances avoided) if only states
which are comparable in size, population, standards, rather "fluid" parameters like
mentalities or cultures, are involved into the enlargement process. At present, the
inclusion of any number of formerly socialist countries can endanger the
efficiency of the European Union as an international organization. The inclusion
of Turkey in a nearer future may make it collapse.
- and finally, Europe must learn living with a new Germany - a country which has
the largest population and the strongest economy in Europe, and hence claims an
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increasing share in the business called European politics; a country which after
several decades decided to send troops abroad; a country which considers half of
Eastern Europe as its own (economic) sphere of influence, and finally, a country
whose leaders seem to adopt entirely different foreign policies if compared with
the practice of the past few decades.
It is obvious that such conclusions are drawn by someone who would call himself
an Euroskeptic, or, someone who is skeptical about the feasibility of an "ever
closer union". Skepticism, however, does not mean negation. I do not exclude
altogether that the European Union, however big it will grow within the
foreseeable future, will not succeed. The European Union is today far from having
reached a sort of an institutional stability – it is in transition, or, to be more
accurate, in transformation. Just as the human minds which direct it are in
perpetual transformation. Therefore, the only thing I can assert with certitude is
that it is up to the citizens of Europe whether the European Union will succeed,
or, whether it will make Europe become once again a 'dark continent' in the
century to come.
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